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We present a theory of endogenous formation of insurance groups which combines heterogene-
ity on agents￿risk aversion under asymmetric information and lack of enforceability of contracts.
Income sharing inside the group is decided by majority voting and the size of the group ad-
justs to this decision through participation constraints. At equilibrium, all group members agree
on the same imperfect level of income sharing, which yields a constrained-e¢ cient equilibrium.
Comparative statics on the risk faced by the community provide interesting results. A mean
preserving spread of income implies more income sharing and a larger group size. New members,
and possibly even old members may be better o⁄, while non-members are worse-o⁄. These results
have relevant policy implications
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11 Introduction
In rural areas of developing countries, people are exposed to substantial income risks due to large
￿ uctuations of agricultural productions and prices, weather shocks, incomplete markets, ... The
lack of access to formal insurance and credit markets leads individuals to create informal insurance
agreements. These agreements may be bilateral or take the form of larger groups where house-
holds are both consumers and providers of insurance. Since no legal framework exists to enforce
these agreements, they must be designed to be self-enforceable, that is, the expected bene￿ts from
becoming a group member must be, at any point in time, larger than the gains from defection.
Empirical studies of risk-sharing ￿nd evidence of partial insurance in rural communities but
uniformly reject the hypothesis of full insurance at the community level (Deaton (1992), Townsend
(1994), Udry (1994), Grimard (1997), Jalan & Ravallion (1999), Ligon et al. (2002), Gertler &
Gruber (2002)). It appears that the major constraint explaining the failure of full insurance arises
from the lack of e⁄ective enforcement mechanism to support these insurance arrangements.
In this paper, we present a theory of endogenous formation of insurance groups which reproduces
the above mentioned stylized facts and discuss its normative properties. The model combines
heterogeneity on agents￿ risk aversion under asymmetric information and lack of enforceability
of contracts involving group members. Insurance services are repeated over time, and members
reneging on their commitment are permanently excluded from the group. This framework gives
rise to an ad interim participation constraint, ￿rst introduced by Coate & Ravallion (1993): when
incomes are observed, members drawing a high income face a trade-o⁄ between the current gain of
keeping the integrality of this income and the loss of all future insurance services. This constraint is
more likely to be binding for agents whose risk aversion is low. Since agents￿types are unobservable,
and all members of the community want to bene￿t from insurance ex ante, the only variable on
which the group has to agree is the extent of insurance provided by the group, that is, the income
sharing rule. The decision-making process is modeled by majority voting. The size of the insurance
group decreases since members whose participation constraint is not satis￿ed progressively leave
the group as they draw high incomes. This change in the group composition in the early periods of
the group calls for a new vote at each period as long as the group size is not stable.
We show that in the long run, all group members agree on the same imperfect level of income
sharing, which maximizes their utility subject to the participation constraint. This equilibrium is
constrained e¢ cient, that is, given the participation constraint, no agent can be made better-o⁄
without reducing the utility of one agent. Indeed, decreasing income sharing in order to ensure
that the participation constraint of new members would be satis￿ed reduces the utility of current
members. A comparative statics analysis with respect to an increase in the risk faced by the
community is also provided. Interestingly, a mean preserving spread (MPS further) has a positive
e⁄ect on both the level of the sharing rule and the size of the group, which unambiguously improves
2the quality of insurance and allows more agents to become members. Since a mean preserving
spread increases the group size, three groups of agents emerge and are a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways.
First, the e⁄ect of a MPS has an ambiguous impact on the welfare of the agents who were already
members prior to its introduction. Second, the "new members", who are the agents who enter the
group thanks to the MPS, enjoy a higher welfare thanks to the increase in risk. Finally, the third
group of agents who are still out of the insurance group is worse-o⁄ after the introduction of the
MPS. Therefore, while the income risk increases, some agents￿welfare may be improved. These
results stress that one has to be careful about introducing risk-reducing policies without accounting
for the adverse e⁄ect they might have on the stability of local communities.
Related literature
Important contributions have studied risk-sharing agreements in rural societies by accounting
for the lack of contract enforceability, starting with Coate & Ravallion (1993). The space of possible
e¢ cient contracts limited to stationary transfers considered by Coate & Ravallion (1993) has been
expanded to dynamic e¢ cient arrangements (Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon et al. (2002)), maintaining
the crucial and detrimental role of ad interim participation constraints.
All these models conclude that the extent of insurance provided by the group is limited. However,
they consider the size of the group and the characteristics of its members as exogenous. This paper
contributes to the literature by endogenizing both the extent of insurance provided by the group
and the size of the group itself under asymmetric information. The model takes account that the
bene￿ts from risk-sharing derive not only from the extent of risk-sharing but also from the overall
size of the insurance arrangement while maintaining the role of the lack of contract enforceability.
More precisely, there is a trade-o⁄to the quality of insurance: it can be improved by increasing both
the group size and the extent of risk-sharing. However, due to the lack of contract enforceability,
an increase in the extent of risk-sharing results in a smaller size of the insurance group. Only few
theoretical papers have studied the endogenous formation of insurance groups. Relying upon an
argument of coalition-proofness, Genicot & Ray (2003) prove the existence of an upper bound on
the size of insurance groups and show that the degree of risk-sharing is non-monotonic in the level
of uncertainty or need for insurance in the community. Bold (2009) focuses on the optimal contract
on the set of history-dependant contracts that are robust with respect to coalition deviations. In
this paper, the problem of deviations by coalitions is not present since at equilibrium, all group
members agree on the same sharing rule level, which maximizes their utility.1
Other considerations may also be advanced to explain the group size limits as cast, kinship,
or informational problems. Murgai et al. (2002) suggest another explanation to the boundaries of
mutual insurance groups and the quality of insurance within these groups based on costs of group
formation and transaction costs.
1This simpli￿cation arises from the assumption on agents￿mean-variance preferences, which introduces separability
and leads all members to only focus on minimizing the income variance despite their di⁄erences in risk aversion.
3This paper provides relevant insights for policy makers since it shows that policies reducing
income variance at the community level have ambiguous impacts on welfare. Such policies should
therefore be accompanied by measures protecting non-members of insurance groups, since their
numbers are likely to increase.
Section 2 presents the model and describes the equilibrium. Comparative statics are provided
in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The economy is composed of a ￿nite number of agents i where i 2 f1;:::Ng with N ￿ 2. Each
agent lives for an in￿nity of periods t 2 f1;2;:::;+1g and draws at each period a random income
Yit that is high h with probability p and low l with probability (1 ￿ p). Yit is independently and
identically distributed across agents and periods.2 For all i 2 f1;:::Ng and t 2 f1;2;:::;+1g, the
mean and the variance of the income are
E(Yit) = ph + (1 ￿ p)l ￿ ￿; (1)
V ar(Yit) = p(1 ￿ p)(h ￿ l)2 ￿ ￿2: (2)
Agents are heterogeneous in risk aversion. This captures various sources of heterogeneity in terms of
preferences but also in terms of capacities to mitigate risk, for example by diversifying production,
or to face shocks thanks to consumption smoothing mechanisms. Agents￿coe¢ cient of absolute
risk aversion a is private information and follows a distribution F(a) inside the population. Agents￿
instantaneous preferences are de￿ned over the mean and the variance of their income. Agent i at
period t has instantaneous utility:
uit(Cit) = E(Cit) ￿ aiV ar(Cit); (3)
where Cit is the agent￿ s disposable income which is entirely consumed at each period.3 In other
words, if this agent is not a member of the insurance group, Cit = Yit, whereas if he/she is a
member of the group, Cit = Iit, where Iit is the post-transfer -insured- income de￿ned by the
following sharing rule. At each period t, each member i concedes a proportion ￿ 2 [0;1] of his/her
income Yi and the sum of all contributions is equally split. Without loss of generality, this technology
is assumed costless. Formally,



















2The zero correlation assumed here is just a convenient simpli￿cation. Indeed, correlation needs not be nil for the
surplus of mutual insurance to exists.
3The mean-variance utility function is an approximation of all CARA utility functions. Indeed, using the Arrow-
Pratt approximation of the risk premium, we can write the certainty equivalent as CX ￿ E(X) ￿
1
2A(X)V ar(X),
where A(X) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion.
4where i;j 2 f1;:::ng and n is the number of agents committing to the insurance group.4 The mean
income under mutual insurance is unchanged, while the variance of income is smaller than V ar(Yit):
E(Iit) = ph + (1 ￿ p)l ￿ ￿
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2 [0;1]:
Note that for any ￿ 2 [0;1], the larger the size of the insurance group, the lower the variance.5 This




￿Yjt, is less variable when














(1 ￿ ￿) (6)
￿ 0:
Since both arguments unambiguously decrease the income variance and therefore increase utility, one
might wonder why, in the absence of ex ante moral hazard, the insurance network is not composed
of the whole community and does not apply perfect sharing: n = N, ￿ = 1.6 The reason thereof
is due to the fact that the insurance scheme is repeated over time. This repetition gives rise to the
so-called ad interim constraint: some agents might have an incentive to renege on their membership
obligations once they observe their income draw. Indeed, this case will emerge if the current gain
of not sharing income exceeds all the future gains of mutual insurance. Let us analyze this problem
in detail by ￿rst describing the ad interim stage.
4In this model, n is endogenous.
5Note that there is no reduction in the variance (￿ = 1) if the insurance group is composed of a single individual
(n = 1) or no income is shared (￿ = 0). Also, if perfect sharing is applied, ￿(1;n) =
1
n.
6Under ex ante moral hazard, the distribution of incomes is endogenous and insurance might have a negative e⁄ect
on agents￿e⁄ort to obtain a high income.
52.1 The ad interim participation constraint
At the ad interim stage, an agent observes the income he/she has drawn, but not the other agents￿
income, which he/she considers as random variables. Formally, agent i observes the drawn income
y 2 fl;hg, so that the post-transfer income at the ad interim stage if i respects the agreement is:
IAI









where the ￿rst two terms are constant and the last one is a sum of random variables. Therefore,


















= (n ￿ 1)
￿2
n2￿2: (8)
On the other hand, if the agent does not respect the agreement, his/her consumption does not















In other words, because at the ad interim stage agents only observe their own income, respecting the
insurance agreement instead of breaking it increases a member￿ s income variance by (n ￿ 1) ￿2
n2￿2.






which is positive if the agent had drawn a low income, and negative if he/she had drawn a high
income. Since agents drawing a high income both face a higher variance and are net contributors
to the group, they might be tempted to renege on their obligations. In order to limit the extent
of this phenomenon the group applies a trigger strategy, which consists in permanently excluding
transgressors from all future insurance possibilities. Therefore, the actualized total utility at the ad
interim stage of period t0 for an agent who observes an income y and decides to break the agreement
(B) writes:
UAI











6where ￿ 2 [0;1] is a discount factor. Conversely, the actualized total utility of an agent who always
respects the informal agreement (R) writes:
UAI





















We can now formally de￿ne the ad interim participation constraint, which states that the utility of
respecting the agreement is larger than the utility of breaking it:
UAI















This condition highlights the existence of three terms. The two terms on the left hand side pertain
to the income variance and are independent of the income drawn. They indicate that respecting
the agreement implies a trade-o⁄ between reducing the income variance of all future periods and
increasing the contemporaneous one. It can be shown that the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates the second for
all n and ￿ under the su¢ cient condition that agents exhibit a reasonable level of patience (￿ > 1=3).
The sign of the right hand side depends on the income drawn and represents the expected transfer
that the agent o⁄ers to the group. Clearly, if y = l, this transfer is negative, so that the participation
constraint is always satis￿ed (under the above mentioned restriction on ￿). Having described all the
e⁄ects, one can simplify and rewrite the participation constraint under the form of a lower bound
on risk aversion, for the only relevant case where y = h:











Therefore, given n and ￿, the number of agents whose ad interim constraint is respected, nR, is:
nR = 1 + (N ￿ 1)(1 ￿ F (￿)): (11)
As we have seen from the previous equations, agents who are the most eager to enter the insurance
group and respect the agreement are those who are the most averse to risk. We also know that
the larger the group size and the larger the sharing rule, the better for all agents, provided that all
members respect the transfer rule. However, setting a large level of income sharing has a negative
impact on the number of agents who can credibly commit to always respect the group￿ s transfer
rule. The next subsection describes the mechanism behind the group formation.
72.2 Group formation
We have seen that a large group size is desirable, since this improves risk spreading. However,
depending on the level of the sharing rule, some agents might choose to renege on their obligations
towards the group when they draw a high income. When this is the case, the sanction they undergo
is permanent exclusion from the group. The key to group formation is therefore to ￿nd the optimal
trade-o⁄ between the group￿ s size and its sharing rule.
Preferences of agents are unobservable, so that it is not possible to exclude agents from the group
before they choose not to respect the insurance contract. Therefore, for any degree of ￿ at the ￿rst
period, the whole community enters the group. However, as soon as incomes are drawn at the ad
interim stage, a fraction of the community leaves the group. On average, the number of agents who
don￿ t respect the contract and leave the group at the ad interim stage of the ￿rst period equals
p(N ￿ nR), that is, the fraction of agents who receive a high income p times the N ￿ nR agents
whose ad interim participation constraint is not satis￿ed. More generally, the expected number of
agents who leave the group at period t ￿ 1 is p(1 ￿ p)
t￿1 (N ￿ nR). Conversely, the number of
agents remaining in the group at period t is nR + ( N ￿ nR)(1 ￿ p)
t on average. As t becomes
su¢ ciently large, the size of the group converges towards its stable level nR with probability 1.7
Since nR itself depends on n, the equilibrium size, which is noted n￿, is de￿ned formally by the
following implicit function:
n￿ = nR (￿;n￿): (12)
Since preferences are unobservable, and the composition and size of the group follows a process
of successive exits, the group￿ s only decision variable is the sharing rule ￿ that is imposed to all its
members. The e⁄ect of the sharing rule on the steady state group size is obtained by applying the













An increase in ￿ decreases nR, but the net e⁄ect on n￿ is negative only if the increase in nR due to an
increase in n is not too strong. Indeed, a low level of sharing decreases the incentives to participate
in the insurance group, but on the other hand, the participation constraint, which de￿nes nR, is
more severely binding if ￿ is high. The actual group size is a result of this tension. This is stated
in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 The steady state size of the insurance group n￿ decreases when ￿ increases if and only
if @nR
@n < 1.
Proof. The proof and a discussion of the condition that @nR
@n < 1 are provided in the appendix.
7Note that the higher p, the higher the speed of convergence.
8Prior to de￿ning the equilibrium characteristics of the group, let us describe how preferences
of members are aggregated. Since all agents of the community are willing to bene￿t from the
insurance provided by the group, the whole community at the ￿rst stage has to agree on the level
of ￿ which will be applied. The aggregation of preferences is modeled by majority voting. Since
the composition of the group is likely to change over the ￿rst periods of the group￿ s life, a new vote
is organized at the beginning of each period, until the group composition is stable.
Proposition 1 de￿nes the characteristics of the group once it is stable, that is, when all members
of the group satisfy the participation constraint.
Proposition 1 Under the necessary condition that @nR
@n < 1, the steady-state group characteristics









Proof. We proceed by ￿rst solving the voting game at the ￿rst period and show how the changes in
group composition a⁄ect the votes of the subsequent periods. To solve the voting game at period 1,
one has to de￿ne the preferred ￿ of each agent. Let us start with the most risk averse agent of the
community. He/she will choose a level of sharing which maximizes his/her utility as a permanent
member of the insurance group, taking into account both the direct e⁄ect of ￿ on variance reduction
and its indirect e⁄ect on the reduction of the steady-state/stable group size.8 Let us de￿ne this





Since we focus on the steady-state group size (12) and agents anticipate the e⁄ect of ￿ on n￿, the

























Note that the second order condition is satis￿ed as shown in the appendix. The preferred level ￿￿
de￿nes a lower bound on risk aversion ￿(￿￿) above which the participation constraint is satis￿ed
and a stable group size de￿ned by (12). Interestingly, all the agents whose risk aversion is larger
than ￿(￿￿) also have a preferred ￿ equal to ￿￿. Indeed, for all i such that ai ￿ ￿(￿￿), the
preferred ￿ does not depend on risk aversion since ￿￿ is given by equation (13), which does not
depend on risk aversion. In other words, there is a mass nR whose preferred ￿ is ￿￿. If the
8For simplicity, we neglect the dynamics of group size in the initial stages and focus on the steady-state group size
n
￿.
9distribution of risk aversion in the community is such that these n￿ (￿￿) agents form a majority
(that is n￿ (￿￿)=N ￿ 1=2), the group￿ s sharing rule is set at ￿￿ at period 1.
What happens if these agents don￿ t form a majority at period 1? We then have to analyze the
preferred ￿ of agents j 2 fn￿ (￿￿) + 1;:::;Ng, that is, agents whose aj is lower than ￿(￿￿). These
agents know that at ￿￿, they will exclude themselves from the group as soon as they draw a high
income. If the discount factor is su¢ ciently large, so that the future bene￿ts of mutual insurance
are su¢ ciently important, the preferred ￿ of these agents is lower than ￿￿ and is set so as to make
their ad interim participation constraint binding. By doing so, they will always bene￿t from the
insurance provided by the group.9 The voting problem at stage 1 is therefore solved by the median







Having solved the voting problem at period 1, let us now analyze the subsequent periods. As time
passes, agents whose a is lower than ￿(￿￿
m) leave the group. This change in group composition
calls for a new vote on the level of the sharing rule. Since only the least risk averse agents leave the
group, the pro￿le of preferred ￿￿ s shrinks at the bene￿t of those who prefer ￿￿, which eventually
form a majority. In other words, if voting is repeated, as agents leave the group, the steady-state
group characteristics are determined by ￿￿ and n￿.
Note that the implicit equation de￿ning ￿￿ which is presented in Proposition 1 can be equiva-







This equation has a clear interpretation: at ￿￿, the marginal e⁄ect of ￿ on the group size at the
steady state must be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of ￿ for n which keeps the variance
of the insured income constant.
Another important remark concerns possible deviations by coalitions. Clearly, since all group
members unanimously have the same preferred alpha, the group is not subject to such deviations.
This result is a direct implication of the assumption on agents￿mean-variance preferences, which
introduces separability and leads all members to only focus on minimizing the income variance
despite their di⁄erences in risk aversion.
Agents who left the group are not part of our focus, but it is nonetheless interesting to notice
that they may form another group among themselves. The information revealed by the exclusion
is limited: they all know that leaving the ￿rst group shows a type (risk-aversion) below the level
required by the participation constraint at the time of the exit. Since the participation constraint
of the ￿rst group evolves monotonically, re-entry is never an issue. The problem faced by those who
are excluded in this process is very similar to the original problem of the population, but with a
strictly smaller interval of types. This interval being composed of low levels of risk-aversion, the
equilibrium sharing rate will be lower in the second group than in the ￿rst one. Society as a whole
9The preferred ￿ of these agents is discussed formally in the Appendix.
10ends up being strati￿ed in groups ordered by insurance coverages and attitudes towards risk.
Let us conclude this section by normatively assessing the equilibrium.
Proposition 2 The steady-state equilibrium is constrained-e¢ cient.
Proof. We have to show that ￿￿ is such that the welfare of an agent cannot be improved without
decreasing another agent￿ s utility given the enforceability and informational constraints. First,
nobody inside the group can be made better-o⁄ as all members agree on the same preferred level
￿￿. Non-members could clearly be better-o⁄ by entering the group, but this would require to
decrease ￿ to make their participation constraint satis￿ed. In that case, the n￿ (￿￿) members would
be worse o⁄ since ￿￿ maximizes U(R).
3 Comparative statics
The aim of this section is to highlight the e⁄ects of the parameters on the degree of income pooling
and the size of the insurance group. Indeed, the quality of insurance that is achieved in a given
group is characterized by both characteristics of the group.
3.1 Mean Preserving Spread
In order to isolate the e⁄ect of an increase in the uninsured income risk on the quality of insurance
while holding the other parameters of the distribution of Y , namely ￿ and p, ￿xed, we apply the
following transformation to h and l:










By doing so, the distribution of Y depends on the parameters ￿, ￿2, p, which are independent of
each other. In other words, we can now analyze the e⁄ect of a mean preserving spread, that is,
an increase in ￿ while holding the mean ￿ (and the distribution of income probabilities) constant.
Proposition 3 describes the e⁄ect of a MPS on the characteristics of the group at the steady-state.
Proposition 3 A mean preserving spread of Y has a positive impact on both ￿￿ and n￿ (￿￿):
d￿￿
d￿
j￿ cst > 0
dn￿
d￿
j￿ cst > 0:
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix.
11Therefore, when the pre-transfer income risk increases, the size of the insurance group increases
and group members share a higher proportion of income. The impact of a higher risk therefore
implies a reinforcement of communities.
Let us discuss why the MPS leads to an increase in both ￿￿ and n￿, which may seem surprising at
￿rst since n￿ is decreasing in ￿. To see this, ￿rst recall that an increase in the risk of the pre-transfer
income incites group members to increase the quality of insurance, that is, to decrease ￿. Increasing
income sharing ￿ is one way to reach this objective. However, we know that increasing ￿ tightens
the participation constraint, which may lead to a decrease in the number of members. However, an
increase in ￿ also has the e⁄ect of loosening the participation constraint, since non-members are
more reluctant to face a larger uninsured risk. At equilibrium, the net e⁄ect on the group size is
positive.
The following corollary states that since both e⁄ects go in the same direction at equilibrium,
the quality of insurance is unambiguously improved. This does not mean however that the variance
of the insured income Iit is lower.
Corollary 1 A mean preserving spread of Y has a positive impact on the quality of the insurance,
that is,
d￿(￿￿;n￿(￿￿))
d￿ < 0. The net e⁄ect on the variance of the insured income, ￿￿2, is ambiguous.
Proof. Applying Proposition 3, the proof of the corollary is straightforward since ￿ is decreasing
in both ￿ and n. A formal proof is provided in the Appendix.
The reason why the net e⁄ect on the variance of the insured income is ambiguous is the following.
In addition to the reaction of members through ￿, some of the agents whose participation constraint
was not satis￿ed now enter the group and contribute to improve the insurance quality. It is therefore
unclear whether the insured income variance should increase or not.
Let us conclude this section on the mean preserving spread by discussing its normative implica-
tions.
3.2 Normative analysis of the impact of a mean preserving spread
Since a mean preserving spread increases the group size, three groups of agents are relevant for this
normative analysis.
First, the agents who were already members prior to the introduction of the MPS. A direct
implication of Corollary 1 is that the e⁄ect of a mean preserving has an ambiguous impact on the
welfare of these "old members".
Second, the "new members" are the agents who entered the group thanks to the MPS. Interest-
ingly, the MPS may have a positive impact on the new members￿welfare.
Third, agents who are still out of the insurance group. Obviously, these agents are worse-o⁄
after the introduction of the MPS.
12Proposition 4 The e⁄ect on welfare of a marginal mean preserving spread of Y
1. is ambiguous for "old members" of the group
2. is positive for "new members"
3. is negative for agents who remain out of the group.
Proof. The proof of part 1 is a direct implication of Corollary 1. Part 2 comes from the fact that new
members bene￿t from a discrete decrease in risk since they now bene￿t from insurance. This discrete
decrease always dominates the marginal increase in variance.10 Part three is straightforward.
Let us conclude this normative analysis by a numerical simulation showing that the MPS can
e⁄ectively increase the utility of "old members". Let us de￿ne the following parameters￿values:
N = 120, ￿ = 1, h = 2, ￿ = 0:8, and the support of the uniform distribution for risk aversion is
[a;b] = [1;2]. The following table provides the most salient results for these parameter values.
For an agent ai = 1;81; when ￿2 = 0;15; Ui = 4;97;
when ￿2 = 0;12; Ui = 3;64:
For an agent ai = 2; when ￿2 = 0;15; Ui = 4;96;
when ￿2 = 0;12; Ui = 4;92:
First note that in this example, a new member is clearly better o⁄ with the increase in ￿. Indeed,
for ￿2 = 0:12, an agent with a risk aversion coe¢ cient of 1:81 is out of the group and has a utility
level of 3:64. By increasing ￿2 to 0:15, this agent￿ s participation constraint is now satis￿ed and he
enters the group, which provides him with a utility level of 4:97.
Second, and most interesting is the case of the agent with a risk aversion level of 2, that is the
most risk averse agent of the community, who already was a member for ￿2 = 0:12 and had a utility
level of 4:92. This level increases to 4:96 when the variance increases to 0:15.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a theory of endogenous formation of insurance groups in rural communities
with heterogeneity on agents￿risk aversion with asymmetric information and lack of contract en-
forceability. Insurance services are repeated over time, and members reneging on their commitment
are permanently excluded from the group which gives rise to ad interim participation constraints.
Agents vote on the level of income to be shared inside the insurance group, taking into account the
fact that a higher sharing rule tightens participation constraints and therefore reduces the size of
the group.
We show that in the long run, all group members agree on the same sharing rule, which maximizes
their utility subject to the participation constraint. This equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient, that
10A formal proof of this argument is provided in the appendix.
13is, given the participation constraint, no agent can be made better-o⁄ without reducing the utility
of one agent. Interestingly, a mean preserving spread has a positive e⁄ect on both the level of
the sharing rule and the size of the group, which unambiguously improves the quality of insurance
and allows more agents to become members. Since a mean preserving spread increases the group
size, three groups of agents emerge and are a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways. First, the e⁄ect of a MPS
has an ambiguous impact on the welfare of the agents who were already members prior to its
introduction. Second, the "new members" who are the agents who entered the group thanks to the
MPS. Interestingly, the MPS has a positive impact on their welfare. While the third group of agents
who are still out of the insurance group is worse-o⁄ after the introduction of the MPS. Therefore,
while the income risk increases, some agents￿welfare may be improved. These results stress that
one has to be careful about introducing risk-reducing policies without accounting for the adverse
e⁄ect they might have on the stability of local communities.
145 Appendix
5.1 Proof and discussion of Lemma 1
















To see why, it su¢ ces to show that
@nR
@￿























The participation constraint will be respected by a lower number of agents if the share of income
which members transfer to the pool increases (provided some agents in the community have a risk
aversion level equal to ￿).
Let us now discuss the denominator. The participation constraint will be respected by a larger
number of agents if the size of the insurance group increases:
@nR
@n



















Let us ￿nally discuss the relevance of the condition that @nR
@n < 1. This condition is the least likely
to hold is when ￿ is large and n is small. Let us therefore compute @nR
@n for ￿ = 1 and n = 2. In
this particular case, @nR













15If F0(￿) = 0, the condition is always trivially satis￿ed. If ￿ takes one of the possible values in the
distribution, posing F0(￿) = 1=N which boils down to ignore distributional e⁄ects by imposing a














2 < p(h ￿ l):
This condition is satis￿ed when agents are su¢ ciently patient (￿ close to 1) or if the probability of
drawing a high income and the di⁄erence between high and low incomes are high. This means that
agents will be willing to build a mutual insurance group if they are su¢ ciently patient.
5.2 Second order condition for ￿￿
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p(h ￿ l)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (n ￿ 1) + 1
￿
￿









n2 (1 ￿ ￿)
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p(h ￿ l)(1 ￿ ￿)














5.3 Preferred ￿ of agents who don￿ t respect the ad interim constraint for ￿ = ￿￿
Two opposite forces are at work in the determination of these agents￿preferred ￿. On the one hand,
if they know they will have to leave the group for ￿ = ￿￿, they might as well prefer a larger ￿
17and hope to bene￿t from a high insurance as long as they draw low incomes. On the other hand,
they might prefer a level of ￿ strictly lower than ￿￿ in order to be able to satisfy the ad interim
constraint and permanently bene￿t from the insurance group. Formally, choosing a lower ￿ means















































On the other hand, starting from the assumption that the agent would not be able to satisfy the
ad interim constraint, his preferred ￿ maximizes Uj, where
Uj = pUB + (1 ￿ p)uR + (1 ￿ p)￿ (pUB + (1 ￿ p)uR)
+(1 ￿ p)
2 ￿2 (pUB + (1 ￿ p)uR) + :::







1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿
(pUB + (1 ￿ p)uR)
Only uR is a⁄ected by ￿, and the value which maximizes uR is such that
n ￿ 1
n






so that the maximal Uj is
1



































the agent whose risk aversion is lower than ￿(￿￿) prefers a lower ￿￿























One can see that the LHS is divided by (1 ￿ ￿), whereas the RHS is divided by 1 ￿ (1 ￿ p)￿.
Therefore, if ￿ and p are su¢ ciently large, the LHS always dominates the RHS.
185.4 Comparative Statics
Let us assume for the comparative statics that the distribution of risk aversion is approximated by
a continuous uniform distribution with support [a;b]. One can then rewrite nR as




























































= ￿￿￿￿ < 0;
@2nR
@￿2 = ￿￿￿￿￿ < 0;
@2nR
@￿@n
= ￿￿￿n￿ > 0;
@nR
@n
= ￿￿￿n > 0 but < 1;
@2nR






































































































































































































































































































5.4.1 Proof of proposition 3
We write h and l as functions of ￿;￿ and p:









































































































= ￿￿￿￿￿ > 0;
with ￿￿￿ = ￿￿￿1￿￿ < 0;
@nR
@￿
= ￿￿￿￿ > 0;









































































































































































































































































































































































































5.4.2 Proof of corollary 1







































5.4.3 Proof of proposition 4
First note that when the pre-transfer income variance is higher, more agents are part of the insurance
group since dn￿
d￿ > 0. To see an improvement of the welfare of these agents as the income variance













￿ = ￿0 + ￿￿;
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